



AN INSIGHT INTO IRAN'S RECRUITMENT TACTICS & USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS



Spreading Justice

HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS (IN IRAN)

AN INSIGHT INTO IRAN'S RECRUITMENT TACTICS & USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

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INTRODUCTION

Iran has a well-documented history of allegations regarding the use of child soldiers, a practice dating back to the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 and persisting thereafter. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, a significant portion, approximately 10%, of Iranian prisoners in Iraq were minors.¹ During the Iran-Iraq conflict, children as young as nine were coerced into assisting in mine-clearing efforts, frequently restrained together by ropes to prevent escape.

The recruitment practices of Iran's military authorities have stirred controversy, often targeting the most economically disadvantaged segments of society. This includes compelling asylum seekers, immigrants, and even children to join their ranks. Of particular concern is the Fatemiyoun, a paramilitary group predominantly involved in the Syrian civil war, known for enlisting Afghan immigrants and minors in exchange for, among other incentives, residency rights.

This report delves into the operations of the Fatemiyoun, shedding light on their recruitment of child soldiers and immigrant populations for military engagements in Syria.

¹ [The Borgen Project, CHILD SOLDIERS IN IRAN.](#)

THE ORIGIN OF THE FATEMIYOUN

The Fatemiyoun Brigade, commonly known as, and referred to hereafter as the Fatemiyoun, stands as a formidable paramilitary force closely aligned with Iran's Quds Force. Established formally in 2013 by Alireza Tavasoli, also known as Abu Hamid, its inception harbors deeper roots, echoing back to the tumultuous era of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.² Originally composed of a mere 22 individuals, mobilized by Tavasoli under the banner of the 'Defenders of the Haram,' the precursor to Fatemiyoun, the group has since evolved into a significant force. These early days witnessed a diverse composition within the militia, comprising Mujahid Afghans who fought during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and against the Taliban, alongside Afghans who actively participated in the Iraq-Iran war. Additionally, Afghans residing in both Iran and Syria lent their strength to this force.^{3 4}

Abu Hamed's vision transcended geopolitical boundaries, encapsulated by the brigade's foundational belief that Islam knows no such constraints. This ideology finds expression in their steadfast commitment to defending oppressed Muslims wherever they may be, as articulated by their leaders: "geographic boundaries have no meaning in Islam."⁵

Almost all other key early members of the Fatemiyoun militia, including Seyed Hakim, Hossein Fadaei Abdarchi, Reza Khavari and Seyed Ebrahim, were killed in the Syrian civil war in 2015 and 2016.⁶

In its initial stage, the brigade forged strategic alliances, collaborating closely with Iraqi factions like "Kataib Seyyed al-Shohda" and affiliated militias. However, it was in May 2013 that the brigade underwent a significant transformation, rebranding itself as the renowned "Fatemiyoun

² Kanishka Nawabi, [Fatemiyoun: Iran's 'Good Taliban'](#)

³ Iran's Metropolis News Agency ["Lashkar Fatemiyoun" has the largest number of martyrs of the](#) ;

⁴ [Shahid Ebrahim Hadi Publications Fatemiyoun book : biographies and audible anecdotes of the forty martyrs of the Fatemiyoun army](#)

⁵ IRIB News Agency, [Fatemiyoun army: The unsung heroes of the fight against ISIS](#)

⁶ Kaneshka, Nawabi, ['Fatemiyoun Brigade: "Good Taliban" for Iran'](#)

Brigade." This shift marked a pivotal moment in the brigade's trajectory, signaling its formal emergence onto the global stage.⁷

Recruitment efforts expanded significantly, with the brigade casting its net wide, tapping into various sectors within Iran, from factories to prisons, in search of new recruits. Joining the ranks of the Fatemiyoun often necessitated a reputable reference, spurring the establishment of extensive networks across Afghanistan to facilitate this process. Furthermore, Iranian-operated offices were identified as pivotal hubs tasked with recruiting individuals, including Afghan children and youth, into the brigade's fold.⁸

According to Savash Pargham, a journalist and analyst of Iranian affairs, in a conversation with Spreading Justice⁹, stated, to join the ranks of the Fatemiyoun militia group one needs a good reference. This created an army of references inside Afghanistan to serve this purpose. In this conversation, Pargham also added that "in addition, there are offices across Iran that operate under the direction of the Quds Force and are responsible for recruiting people, including Afghan children and youth, to join the Fatemiyoun Brigade."

In 2018, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, estimated the number of members of the Fatemiyoun Army at 5,000 and said that 2,000 of them were serving in Syria.¹⁰ In August 2019, in an international conference in Mashhad, the Fatemiyoun announced that the militia group will continue to work until the "destruction" of Israel and the creation of a "new Islamic civilization".¹¹ These statements echoed sentiments often expressed by leaders of the Islamic regime in Tehran, but this time they were being uttered by a group like the Fatemiyoun and other proxy forces. By that time, over 2,800 of these individuals were reported to have been killed or disabled.¹² The Islamic Republic of Iran considers these individuals as veterans.

⁷ Iran's Metropolises News Agency ["Lashkar Fatemiyoun" has the largest number of martyrs of the](#) ;

⁸ Radio France Internationale, [Liberation: Afghans are the "balloon fodder" of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Syria](#), Radio France Internationale

⁹ Spreading Justice is a database launched by HRA used to document violations in real-time and is updated daily.

¹⁰ Tasmin News, [Who is "Father Fatemiyoun"?](#)

¹¹ Akbari, Alireza [Who is Fatemiyoun and what is ISIS?](#)

¹² The International Quran News Agency, [Fatemiyoun battalion commander's memories of the bravery of Afghan Shiites in the battle with ISIS/Sending 80,000 people to Syria](#)

Fatemiyoun's organizational structure encompasses specialized units, including reconnaissance intelligence, sniper, and unmanned aerial vehicle units. Moreover, since 2016, the brigade has been bolstered by heavy weaponry, including Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks, augmenting its efficacy on the battlefield.

While the Islamic Republic of Iran extols the brigade as heroic stalwarts in the fight against ISIS, detractors within Afghanistan cast them as proxies serving Tehran's interests, antagonistic to Western influence. This duality encapsulates the complex role played by the Fatemiyoun Brigade in contemporary geopolitical dynamics, where narratives of heroism intertwine with accusations of proxy warfare.¹³

AXIS OF RESISTANCE AND IRAN'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SYRIA

In March of 2011, the Syrian people began protesting the government of Bashar al-Assad, which later became part of the Arab Spring movement and eventually led to the Syrian Civil War. According to Brigadier General Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, the former commander of the IRGC in Syria, Iran's leader instructed Qassem Soleimani, who was then the commander of IRGC's Quds Force, to go to Syria and support Bashar al-Assad's regime to prevent its downfall. Chaharbaghi revealed in an interview that he first encountered Qassem Soleimani in Syria in December 2013, where Soleimani began organizing forces and overseeing operations.¹⁴

Hossein Hamdani, one of the commanders who died in Syria, stated in October 2014, that their mission in Syria was to serve the interests of the Islamic Revolution.¹⁵ He likened their sacrifices to those made during the Iran-Iraq war. He mentioned the formation of 42 groups and 128 battalions consisting of approximately 70,000 young individuals from various Islamic sects, including Alawites, Sunnis, and Shiites. This national mobilization force was responsible for maintaining security in Syrian cities and provinces. Additionally, Hamdani claimed that there are 130,000 trained Basij fighters (Iran's armed militia) ready to be deployed to Syria.¹⁶ Iran's presence

¹³ IRIB News Agency, [Fatemiyoun army: The unsung heroes of the fight against ISIS](#)

¹⁴ Radio Farda, [Mahmoud Chaharbaghi: Qassem Soleimani went to Syria to preserve Bashar al-Assad's government](#)

¹⁵ Fars News [The Syrian regime is out of danger of falling](#)

¹⁶ Fars News [The Syrian regime is out of danger of falling](#)

in Syria can be seen as strategically valuable for the axis of resistance, facilitating the expansion of the Iranian regime's influence in the Middle East and West Asia.

In January 2016, Zuhair Mujahid, the cultural attaché of the Fatemiyoun Army, announced that over 2,000 members of the Fatemiyoun Army had been killed and 8,000 had been wounded during the Syrian civil war. This statement caused a strong reaction from the Afghan government at the time, “the blood of the children of this country should not be shed to serve the interests of foreigners in other countries”.¹⁷

According to Samad Rezaei, a Fatemiyoun commander, by September 2018 at least 80,000 individuals had been sent to Syria as part of the Fatemiyoun battalions, of which more than 2,800 were either disabled or killed.^{18 19}

INCENTIVES OFFERED.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan issued a statement prior to the Taliban's rise to power, accusing Tehran of exploiting the vulnerability of Afghan migrants in Iran to advance its sectarian and expansionist agendas in the region: “Tehran has exploited the poverty and deprivation of Afghans who migrated to Iran for better life to advance its sectarian and expansionist goals in the region.”

Today, the Fatemiyoun Brigade predominantly consists of the second generation of Afghan immigrants to Iran, with reports estimating that over 20,000 individuals have undergone training and organization within its ranks. The evidence suggests that Afghan immigrants living in Iran, as well as those seeking asylum, employment, or transit through the country, form the core membership of the brigade. According to Samad Rezaei, one of the commanders of Fatemiyoun

¹⁷ The International Quran News Agency, [Fatemiyoun battalion commander's memories of the bravery of Afghan Shiites in the battle with ISIS/Sending 80,000 people to Syria](#)

¹⁸ Deutsche Welle (DW) [2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded from Fatemiyoun Afghans in Syria](#)

¹⁹ Defapress, [Everything we need to know about Lashkar Fatemiyoun / 2200 Afghan martyrs of holy defense and defender of the shrine](#)

Brigade, at least 80,000 Afghan nationals were sent to Syria in the form of Fatemiyoun Brigade until January 2021.

However, recruitment into the Fatemiyoun Brigade is not always voluntary. Some members have recounted being coerced into joining after being categorized as 'illegal aliens' by Iranian security forces. Faced with limited options, including deportation to Afghanistan or enlistment in the brigade and deployment to Syria, individuals often felt compelled to choose the latter option due to necessity and economic hardship.²⁰

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been instrumental in recruiting Afghan nationals for the Fatemiyoun Brigade and compelling their participation in the Syrian conflict. This recruitment effort involves a combination of persuasive tactics and coercion.^{21 22 23}

One of the approaches used by the IRGC involves appealing to the religious sentiments of Hazaras Shiites in Afghanistan to promote the Fatemiyoun Brigade. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guards have enticed potential recruits with promises of attractive incentives. These include high wages, the possibility of obtaining permanent residence permits, and Iranian identity documents like residence cards, work permits, and family residence permits in Iran. Some former members of Fatemiyoun testified that their monthly income in Iran, before joining the brigade, was only \$150. The IRGC offered them significantly higher payments, ranging from \$700 to \$900 per month, for participating in the conflict in Syria. These financial incentives, combined with religious propaganda, have proven influential in motivating many young Afghans to join Fatemiyoun, particularly those seeking to escape economic hardships and poverty in Afghanistan or Iran.^{24 25}

²⁰ Mukhtar Wafai ["Lashgar Fatemiyoun": The Iranian government's abuse of the poverty of Afghan immigrants](#)

²¹ Mukhtar Wafai ["Lashgar Fatemiyoun": The Iranian government's abuse of the poverty of Afghan immigrants](#)

²² Najibullah, [Afghans recruited by Iran for the Syrian war face false promises](#)

²³ Radio Farda, [Associated Press: The return of "10,000" trained IRGC to Afghanistan](#)

²⁴ Dunya Ekhtaz, [How was the IRGC Quds Force formed?](#)

²⁵ Radio Farda, [Associated Press: The return of "10,000" trained IRGC to Afghanistan](#)

Additionally, the prospect of acquiring valuable Iranian identity documents, including birth certificates or long-term residence permits, has been used as a lure to attract Afghan nationals to join Fatemiyoun. Some former members stated that they were promised Iranian birth certificates upon returning from the war, while others claimed they joined the brigade after recruiters offered to extend their residence permits in Iran in exchange for their service in Syria. These incentives were allegedly presented to a former member when he visited the Office of Foreign Nationals and Immigrants to renew his residence permit.²⁶

Despite the lure of incentives, coercion remains a prevalent tactic in recruitment. Afghan immigrants arrested by Iranian security forces for lacking residency permits have reported being given the ultimatum of joining the Fatemiyoun Brigade or facing deportation. This coercive approach underscores the challenges faced by vulnerable individuals in navigating the complexities of immigration and conflict in the region.²⁷

Lastly, impoverished families leverage their children's "martyr status" for advantages. They obtain financial compensation for each child engaged in conflicts, along with a martyr card granting access to food and other benefits. This manipulation of children, utilized both as instruments of oppression and means of financial support, amplifies the already daunting struggles with poverty experienced by numerous Iranian families.

²⁸The recruitment tactics employed by the IRGC to enlist Afghan nationals into the Fatemiyoun Brigade are multifaceted and often exploit the vulnerabilities of migrants. While financial incentives and promises of identity documents play a significant role in attracting recruits, coercion remains a grim reality for many individuals caught in the crossfire of geopolitical tensions and conflict."

²⁶ Najibullah, [Afghans recruited by Iran for the Syrian war face false promises](#)

²⁷ Farhad Haqiar, [The story of an Afghan immigrant who went to war in Syria](#)

²⁸ [The Borgen Project, CHILD SOLDIERS IN IRAN](#).

CHILD SOLDIERS IN IRAN

WHO WAS RECRUITED, WHERE AND HOW?

According to data from the Afghan Ministry of Immigration in 2017, there were significant numbers of Afghans residing in Iran. The figures showed 839,912 Afghans holding short-term official residence cards, 30,000 with long-term official residence cards, 450,000 with legally issued short-term passports, and an estimated 734,622 Afghans living in Iran without any official government documents, classifying them as illegal residents.²⁹ This challenging situation regarding residency and citizenship for Afghans in Iran created opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran's military bodies to recruit Afghan nationals for Iran's proxy wars.³⁰

Some Fatemiyoun members were immigrants who, after being arrested by the authorities, were coerced into joining the brigade as "illegal aliens" and were subsequently compelled to participate in the Syrian war.³¹ According to Samad Rezaei, one of the commanders of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, at least 80,000 Afghan nationals were deployed to Syria under the banner of the brigade until January 2021.³²

Simultaneously, reports from Afghan officials have confirmed the involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in recruiting and employing Afghan nationals within Afghanistan. The IRGC was reported to have unofficial offices in the country for this specific purpose, primarily focusing on recruiting soldiers for the Fatemiyoun Brigade. Religious and financial incentives were used, particularly among the Shia and poor Hazara communities.³³

²⁹ Tabnak, [Afghans-in-Iran](#)

³⁰ Akhbar Alkhaleej, [The Afghan government responds to Iran's leader: You exploited the poverty of the Afghans for your sectarian goals and expansionist goals.](#)

³¹ Salaam News, [Forced labor of Fatemiyoun members in Iran is "similar to slavery".](#)

³² Radio Farda, [Zarif: We did not send the Afghans to the Syrian war, they went voluntarily](#)

³³ Deutsche Welle, [Afghan refugee: My friend was killed in front of us in Syria](#)

Savash Porgham, an Iranian-Turkish journalist and researcher based in Istanbul, in a conversation with Spreading Justice, corroborated the Quds Force's activities in Afghanistan, aimed at attracting Afghan youths and teenagers to join the Fatemiyoun Brigade. Porgham mentioned that Afghan mercenaries, under the Quds Force's supervision, played a crucial role in this recruitment process, exploiting their titles and positions such as "head of the family," "head of the neighborhood," "leader of the clan," "praying imam of the neighborhood," "dean of the family," or "neighborhood's goon" to influence and attract Afghan children and youth.³⁴

Though the precise number of child soldiers within the Fatemiyoun ranks remains unclear, evidence indicates that the IRGC has utilized children under the age of 18, and even as young as 15, as soldiers to participate in the Syrian war.³⁵ Human Rights Watch reported the recruitment of at least eight Afghan children into the Fatemiyoun Brigade by the IRGC in October 2017. Tragically, all eight of these child soldiers lost their lives in the conflict, with four of them being only 14 years old at the time of their deaths.³⁶ Numerous media outlets, including both Iranian and international sources, have corroborated the use of children under 18 as soldiers in the Fatemiyoun Brigade for the Syrian war, some of whom were directly interviewed³⁷

In November 2016, the International Quran News Agency in Iran confirmed the involvement of a 16-year-old Afghan child soldier in the Fatemiyoun Brigade who was killed in the Syrian war. The soldier's father revealed that his son had falsely declared his age as older to join Fatemiyoun, and the IRGC did not verify his age nor request any identity documents, like a birth certificate during recruitment.³⁸

In 2018, Zuhair Mujahid, the cultural attaché of the Fatemiyoun Army of the time remarked that “the blood of the children of this country should not be shed to serve the interests of foreigners in

³⁴ In a direct Interview with Spreading Justice

³⁵ Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, [Iran: Afghan children were used to fight in Syria](#)

³⁷ Human Rights Watch, [Iran: Afghan children were used to fight in Syria](#)

³⁸ IQNA, [Activities in procurement; The condition of being in the battlefield/ Shahid Rahimi; The youngest defender of the Ahl al-Bayt shrine](#)

other countries” Remarks of these nature indicated that there was knowledge of the recruitment of child soldiers. Nevertheless, nothing was done, and the policy remained.³⁹

Events like the aforementioned, also resulted in the US sanctioning several financial networks that supported the Basij as they have also recruited, trained, and deployed children to fight for them.⁴⁰

There is evidence suggesting that the IRGC commanders were aware of the presence of Afghan child soldiers in the Fatemiyoun Brigade and intentionally recruited them. Their young age made them susceptible to religious propaganda, intimidation, and coercion, making recruitment easier and more effective. Children are often used as propaganda tools, this includes campaigns, and speeches by the Supreme leader to commemorate the 1979 Revolution and Iran’s international involvement in various wars.⁴¹ The website "Harim-E-Haram" in Iran, which covers news related to the "defenders of the Shrine," confirmed the deployment of a 15-year-old child soldier named "Mohammed Bakhshi" within the Fatemiyoun Brigade, indicating that the commanders were aware of his age. This child soldier was killed in the Syrian war.^{42 43}

THE STATUS OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE IRGC MISSION STATEMENT

The Charter of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) does not explicitly address children's rights. However, the employment requirements stipulated in the "bylaws and regulations of the IRGC" states that individuals must be at least 16 years old to be eligible for employment within this organization, including staff, contract, and Basiji special personnel positions.⁴⁴ This is in contrast to the internationally recognized definition of childhood, as outlined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which considers individuals as children until they reach the age of 18.⁴⁵

³⁹ The International Quran News Agency, [Fatemiyoun battalion commander's memories of the bravery of Afghan Shiites in the battle with ISIS/Sending 80,000 people to Syria](#)

⁴⁰ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm524>

⁴¹ Borgen Project [Child Soldiers in Iran](#)

⁴² Seyedah Maryam Hosseini, [A short biography of the 15-year-old martyr of Fatemiyoun Army, "Mohammed Bakshi"](#)

⁴³ Hareem Haram, [Martyr Mohammad Bakshi](#)

⁴⁴ Iran Academic Counseling Center, [Employment in the IRGC](#)

⁴⁵ UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html>

Notably, the issue of defining childhood in Iran is not uniform across various authorities. The majority of Shia religious authorities consider boys to become adults after 15 lunar years and girls after nine lunar years. On the other hand, the National Declaration on the Rights of Children and Adolescents, endorsed in September 2021 by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, defines a child as any person who has not reached the age of puberty, while an adolescent is an adult who has not attained intellectual development commensurate with special rights and duties. This indicates that whether an individual is regarded as a child or not hinges on their level of maturity.⁴⁶

Within Iran's civil laws, a person is either considered a minor or has attained maturity. However, there exists an interpretation referred to as the "age of maturity" for individuals who are deemed immature, implying that they lack the capacity to manage their own finances. Presently, there is no universally accepted specific age for the "age of maturity" in Iran's civil laws. Implicitly, an individual under the age of 18 is considered not to have reached the age of maturity, unless a court's ruling establishes otherwise, designating them as an adult.⁴⁷

Regrettably, the IRGC has a history of employing children, both Iranian and Afghan, utilizing them for military training and subjecting them to rigorous ideological indoctrination, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war and through the establishment of the Basij organization.^{48 49}

The lack of a clear definition and the ambiguity within Iran's civil laws regarding the age of maturity and criminal responsibility has potentially paved the way for entities such as the Revolutionary Guards to recruit children under the age of 18, and even as young as 16, deploying them in confrontations against protesters and opposition forces, both domestically and in different countries such as Syria.

⁴⁶ Dadgaran, [Concepts of the rule of growth - growing age - maturity - young](#)

⁴⁷ Dadgaran, [Concepts of the rule of growth - growing age - maturity - young](#)

⁴⁸ Child Soldiers International, [Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - Iran, 2001](#).

⁴⁹ Aida Ghajar [The Lost Youth of Iran's Child Soldiers](#)

INSTITUTIONS AND COMMANDERS INVOLVED IN RECRUITMENT.

In addition to the IRGC and its sub-forces, another institution involved in the recruitment of Afghan nationals is "Al-Mustafa International University," headquartered in Qom. This religious seminary and university, operating under the supervision of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic, plays a significant role in attracting, educating, and supporting Shia students worldwide.⁵⁰

Evidence indicates that a considerable number of Fatemiyoun members either studied at Al-Mustafa before joining the force or joined while enrolled there. Notably, Reza Bakshi, the deputy commander of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, was the top student of Al-Mustafa International University and was killed in Syria during the battle in Tall Qarin in March 2017. Similarly, Seyed Rahmatollah Mousavi, the director of Fatemiyoun Insight Education Center, who lost his life in Syria in December 2019, was also an Al-Mustafa student. Seyed Zohair Mojahed, the current cultural officer of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, is another notable alumnus from Al-Mustafa University.^{51 52 53 54}

According to Savash Porgham, an Iranian-Turkish journalist and researcher residing in Istanbul, Al-Mustafa University plays a crucial role in persuading and encouraging Afghans to join the Fatemiyoun Brigade. He emphasizes that various cultural, scientific, and religious institutions affiliated with the IRGC and Iran's intelligence-security agencies are responsible for recruiting Afghan youths. He stated that, "one of the largest and most powerful institutions is the Al-Mustafa University, where thousands of Afghan students are trained under the cover of this institution, and then they are recruited by the Fatemiyoun Brigade for the proxy war."

⁵⁰ Kaneshka, Nawabi, 'Fatemiyoun Brigade; "Good Taliban" for Iran', <https://tolonews.com/fa/opinion-169821>

⁵¹ IRIB News, [Biographies and audible anecdotes of the martyrs of Fatemiyoun army in resistance books](#)

⁵² Dolate Bahar, [The cultural officer of Lashkar Fatemiyoun: Purging the Taliban is a strategic mistake](#)

⁵³ Tasnim News, [Who was in charge of the Fatemiyoun fighters delegation in Syria?+ Photo](#)

⁵⁴ Mehr News, [Unassuming men from the resistance/martyrs who were buried in exile](#)

Alireza Araf, the director of Al-Mustafa, confirmed in August 2017 that many graduates from their institution had voluntarily joined the Fatemiyoun and Zainbiyoon forces and had become martyrs or veterans in the process.⁵⁵

The involvement of Al-Mustafa University in recruiting for the Fatemiyoun Brigade was also confirmed by an anonymous former student of the center, who disclosed that clerics associated with the university would visit Afghan religious centers and mosques, supported by the regime, to inspire the audience about the significance of defending Zainab's shrine. This tactic aimed to encourage Afghans to participate in the Syrian war on behalf of the Fatemiyoun Brigade.

In December 2020, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Al-Mustafa University for cooperating with the Quds Force in recruiting Afghan nationals for the Fatemiyoun Brigade. The Department reported that Al-Mustafa's offices worldwide, including Afghanistan, were involved in the recruitment of militia forces for the Syrian war.^{56 57}

Additionally, in certain Iranian governorates, offices were established under the name of the "Qadr Organizing" project to register and attract Afghan nationals to join the Fatemiyoun Brigade. Various other centers, including the IRGC office in the Khomeini Tomb metro station, the foreign nationals office in the Tehran governorate, and several other regional offices, have also been active in recruiting for the Brigade. These centers are in cities such as Shahr-e-Rey, Pishva, Mashhad, Shiraz, Qom, Saveh, Delijan, Kerman, and Torbat-e-Jam.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ 598.IR, [Jamaat al-Mustafi from Lashkar Fatemiyoun and Zainbyoun to Manchester and Madagascar](#)

⁵⁶ Radio Farda, [The intention of the US government to sanction the religious institution under Khamenei](#)

⁵⁷ BBC News, [Ministry of Higher Education of Afghanistan: We are investigating the US decision to sanction Jamiat al-Mustafa University](#)

⁵⁸ *(List of commanders is in the annex)

TESTIMONY

One former member of the Fatemiyoun Brigade shared his testimony with the Hasht e Subh Daily newspaper in Kabul. He revealed that he was smuggled to Iran at the age of 17 due to financial difficulties. However, upon his arrival, he was arrested by security agents and taken to a refugee camp. The Iranian security agents presented him with two options: either to be deported to Afghanistan or to join the Fatemiyoun Brigade and go to Syria. Given the circumstances, the former member felt compelled to participate in the Syrian war to avoid returning to Afghanistan and escaping poverty. Thus, he joined the Fatemiyoun Brigade ⁵⁹.

Human Rights Watch has also confirmed another case involving two 17-year-old Afghan teenagers who were forcibly recruited into the Fatemiyoun Brigade. They underwent military training after being arrested by Iranian security forces. One of the teenagers stated that his cousin, who was not physically fit for combat, was sent back to Afghanistan along with 20 others, while he was sent to a barracks in Varamin, south of Tehran, for military training. The Iranian military officers allegedly told them that they would fight in Syria and become martyrs, presenting it as a positive outcome. After 21 days of training, they were transferred to the airport and sent to Damascus. The former member testified that despite initially being promised a monthly salary of 3 million tomans, he received only a total of 5 million tomans during his three months in Syria. ⁶⁰

In another account, a 14-year-old Afghan child testified to Human Rights Watch that he was arrested by Iranian military agents at the Iran-Turkey border along with 150 other Afghans. The military officers gave them the choice to either volunteer for the war in Syria as members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade or be sent back to Afghanistan. The child stated that none of the detainees agreed to join Fatemiyoun, and as a result, all of them were returned to Afghanistan. ⁶¹

Furthermore, there is a documented case of a 15-year-old child soldier who was recruited into the Fatemiyoun Brigade by IRGC officials. He was granted permission to be on the front lines of the

⁵⁹ [Farhad Haqiar, The story of an Afghan immigrant who went to war in Syria](#)

⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

war. According to a story published by Harim website, the child soldier initially worked in the kitchen due to his young age but later insisted on joining the front lines. Despite being aware of his age, the commanders did not send him back. The website's narrative states that he volunteered to attack the siege of ISIS with five others, and he was subsequently killed in the operation.⁶²

Another former member of the Fatemiyoun Brigade shared his experience with Radio Zamaneh, stating that he joined the group out of desperation. He had been in Syria as a member of Fatemiyoun for two years, participating in 15 operations. The former member mentioned that the advertisements and financial promises made by the IRGC about Fatemiyoun caught his attention after he traveled to Iran in search of employment due to poverty. He and his fellow soldiers were promised Iranian birth certificates if they survived the Syrian war. However, when he was injured in the war and sought financial aid and support from the IRGC, he received a negative response. Eventually, he returned to Afghanistan with lingering injuries from the war.⁶³

TRANSFER OF FORCES

Mahan Air, an Iranian airline, has been subject to accusations of complicity in transporting military personnel, including underage soldiers, to conflict zones within the Middle East and other regions. Mahan Airlines is owned by "Mola Al-Movahedin Ali Ibn Abitalib Charitable Foundation of Kerman Province" and the CEO is Hamid Arabnejad.⁶⁴ Various governments, including the U.S., have identified Mahan Air for its suspected role in aiding activities that contravene international laws and regulations. Operating under the ownership of the "Mola Al-Movahedin Ali Ibn Abitalib Charitable Foundation of Kerman Province," the airline is overseen by CEO Hamid Arabnejad.

While the primary responsibility for transferring these forces to Syria for warfare rests with a private company, it's noteworthy that the Fatemiyoun Brigade's engagement in the conflict is facilitated by a separate entity. This logistical operation has commonly involved two Iranian

⁶² IQNA, [Activities in procurement; The condition of being in the battlefield/ Shahid Rahimi; The youngest defender of the Ahl al-Bayt shrine](#)

⁶³ Mukhtar Wafai, ["Lashgar Fatemiyoun": The Iranian government's abuse of the poverty of Afghan immigrants](#)

⁶⁴ [Mahan Airlines Registration](#)

airlines, namely Air (Homa) and Mahan Airlines. These carriers have directly engaged in transporting IRGC forces, including members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, along with their associated military equipment to Syria.^{65 66 67 68}

Mahan Airlines has been on the US Treasury Department's sanctions list since 2013 due to its direct participation in the transfer of troops and military equipment to Syria, including the transfer of members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade. In February 2019: Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker stated: “This is a regime that preys on the most vulnerable — coercing children as young as 14 years old to fight in Syria under the direction of the IRGC-QF, and perpetuating widespread suffering and displacement,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker. “Iran continues to leverage Mahan Air and its commercial aviation sector to transport individuals and weapons needed to carry out this tragic campaign and to fuel sectarian conflict throughout the region. We are aggressively targeting those who continue to provide commercial support to Mahan Air and other designated airlines, and any who fail to heed our warnings expose themselves to severe sanctions risk.”⁶⁹

This press release further highlighted the recruitment of child soldiers by the Fatemiyoun and coercing them to fight in Syria. It was further discovered that Mahan Airlines flew the bodies of hundreds of Fatemiyoun Division fighters, including those of the child soldiers, from Syria back to Iran, after they were sent to fight there.⁷⁰

The direct participation of Mahan Airlines in the transfer of troops and military equipment to Syria has been confirmed by the IRGC officials. Nosratollah Hosseinipour, one of the IRGC commanders, who himself was present in the Syrian war, had confirmed the transfer of the IRGC forces to Syria by Mahan Airlines. He said: "We fight against the *Zalim* and defend the *Mazlum*, and you should know that during the transfer of troops to Syria, it was only the giant Mahan planes

⁶⁵ Sharq Al-Awsat, [THE QUDS FORCE, MAHAN AIRLINES AND FATEMIYOUN GROUP ARE ON THE LIST OF NEW US SANCTIONS](#)

⁶⁶ Farzin Nadimi, [The Ministry of Treasury increases the pressure on Iranian airlines](#)

⁶⁷ Babak Taqvai, [Concern of "Mahan Air" managers following the disclosure of cooperation documents with the Quds Force](#)

⁶⁸ Babak Taqvai, [Expensive and risky air transfer of weapons from Iran to Syria](#)

⁶⁹ U.S Department of the Treasury [Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Fighter Militias in Syria along with a Civilian Airline Ferrying Weapons to Syria](#)

⁷⁰ U.S Department of the Treasury [Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Fighter Militias in Syria along with a Civilian Airline Ferrying Weapons to Syria](#)

that saved us, because it entered the Damascus airport under enemy's fire and disembarked the troops."⁷¹

A notable revelation from June 2020 sheds light on Mahan Airlines' alleged involvement in covert operations with significant geopolitical implications. A memoir of Mahan Air Pilot Amir He said that on a flight to Syria in 2013, he transported "seven tons of prohibited cargo" which were likely military weapons, and Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani along with 200 passengers to Syria with a Mahan plane suggest the airline's transport of "forbidden cargo" to Syria, prompting discussions about whether this term alludes to military aid or a more intricate role, such as using the airline as a "human shield." This revelation gains credibility from specific accounts of Qassem Soleimani's disguises during these operations to avoid detection, as well as efforts to evade scrutiny from the American-controlled Baghdad watchtower.^{72 73}

Further evidence points toward a deceptive entity named "Hamrah" orchestrating seat leases on Mahan flights to transport military personnel, including members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade. These documents were published because of the hacking of Mahan's website in November of 2021. The individual leading this obscure arrangement, was commander Golparast. Although Iran's domestic media have mentioned commander Golparast as one of the close friends of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, there is not much information about him.⁷⁴

In the broader context, this disclosure aligns with Mahan Airlines' contentious history. The airline, repeatedly accused of supporting terrorism, has faced severe actions from both the United States and European nations, resulting in sanctions and flight restrictions. Despite Iran's denial of these allegations, confirmation from Hosseinipour, a Quds Force commander, lends credence to claims of Mahan Airlines' role in transporting military personnel, including children to Syria through its flights.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Arash Hassania, [flying in the dust; Who owns Mahan Airlines?](#)

⁷² Arash Hassania, [flying in the dust; Who owns Mahan Airlines?](#)

⁷³ BBC, [Pilot Mahan: We took forbidden cargo to Syria with Qassem Soleimani](#)

⁷⁴ Babak Taqvai, [Concern of "Mahan Air" managers following the disclosure of cooperation documents with the Quds Force](#)

⁷⁵ Tasmin News, [Ahvaz airport was decorated with the name of martyr Lieutenant General Haj Qassem Soleimani](#)

Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic in Hassan Rouhani's tenure, has also confirmed the participation of Iranian airlines, especially Iran Air (Homa), in the transfer of troops and military equipment to Syria. In the confidential audio file that was leaked to the media in May 2021, he speaks clearly about this issue. According to Zarif, after Iran Air's name was removed from the US sanctions list in the winter of 2016, the airline's flights to Syria have increased 6 times as a result of Qasem Soleimani's (then commander of the Quds Force) pressure.^{76 77}

In addition to Iran Air (Homa) and Mahan Air, Yas Airlines, Pooya Air and Fars Air Qeshm have also participated in the transfer of military equipment from Iran to Syria. Unlike Iran Air and Mahan, these companies were not active in the large-scale transfer of IRGC forces, including the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and mostly transferred military weapons. Pooya Air is considered to be the transportation branch of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force and has daily flights to Syria.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Tasmin News, [Ahvaz airport was decorated with the name of martyr Lieutenant General Haj Qassem Soleimani](#)

⁷⁷ BBC News, [Soleimani's trip to Moscow; Putin brought Iran's ground forces into the war](#)

⁷⁸ Babak Taqwai, [Expensive and risky air transfer of weapons from Iran to Syria](#)

OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

TRAINING OF TROOPS

A common article to all four Geneva Conventions of 1948: GC I art. 47; GC II art. 48; GC III art. 127; and GC IV art. 144, *The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.* States, including Iran as they are a signatory to the four Geneva Conventions, are obligated to provide training to ensure that military personnel adhere to international humanitarian law (IHL).

The Majority of the Fatemiyoun trained by the IRGC were trained in Iran. These trainings were provided by Imam Hossein IRGC units and conducted in IRGC barracks and military training. In January 2021, Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, one of the IRGC senior commanders in Syria, with the explicit approval of the training of the Fatemiyoun Brigade by IRGC in Iran, said: "Qasem Soleimani proposed this idea [the creation of the Fatemiyoun] to the Supreme Leader and with his approval, these groups were formed. The forces recruited to join the Fatemiyoun, Zainbiyoun, and Heydaryoun at the beginning of the Syrian crisis had a hard time getting themselves to Iran to receive training and go to Syria."⁷⁹ However, there have been reports that stated that some members only received training once in Syria.⁸⁰

Former members of the Fatemiyoun have confirmed that the majority of the Fatemiyoun Brigade received military training in IRGC training camps and by IRGC officers.^{81 82 83 84} Reports

⁷⁹ Radio Farda, [Mahmoud Chaharbaghi: Qassem Soleimani went to Syria to preserve Bashar al-Assad's government.](#)

⁸⁰ Iran Azadi, [Fatemiyoun Division in Syria and their losses during the war in this country \(Part II\)](#)

⁸¹ Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, [The Fatemiyoun Division Afghan Fighters in the Syrian Civil War](#)

⁸² IranWire, [A Fatemiyoun member: Some Afghans are sent to the Syrian war by deception](#)

⁸³ Salaam Times, [Fatemiyoun brigade brings changes in the population map of Syria](#)

⁸⁴ Defa Press, [Establishment of special training courses for Fatemiyoun fighters in Syria](#)

confirmed by different sources have identified four IRGC military training centers, where a significant number of Fatemiyoun Brigade received military training.^{85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92}

Following testimony from several members of the Fatemiyoun it is evident that the law of war or any other form of adequate training was given. This following will highlight the four main IRGC military training centers and their practices.

1. Pazuki barracks between 2014 and the end of 2018

The Pazuki IRGC training barracks are in the city of Pishya, south of Tehran province in Jalil, Abad. It is managed under the command of the 27th division of Mohammad Rasulollah Corps. Through various sources of testimonies of former Fatemiyoun members the location has been confirmed as a training barrack.⁹³



Location of Pazouki Training Barracks

In an interview further confirming the existence of the base, Seyed Alem Akhtari, a former member of the Fatemiyoun, was quoted as saying: *"I was sent to the [Syrian] region in 2014 in Group 30. At that time, the war was very intense, and I worked in the security group. Before the war, in Tehran's Pazuki barracks, within a period of 25 days, everyone was introduced to the rules and type*

*of war, and they taught war to everyone. I was also trained there and sent to the front."*⁹⁴

⁸⁵ BBC News, [Afghanistan investigates the sending of Afghans to Syria by Iran](#)

⁸⁶ DEFA Press, [The dream that made the shepherd, the defender of the shrine/ the secret of Karbala that ended in Syria](#)

⁸⁷ Bill Gertz, [U.S. Identifies Nine Training Camps in Iran for Afghans](#)

⁸⁸ National Council of Resistance of Iran, [Iran regime airs propoganda clip to recruit Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

⁸⁹ National Council of Resistance of Iran-US, [NCRI-US Reveals IRGC's Terrorist Training Camps for Foreign Fighters Inside Iran](#)

⁹⁰ Iran Freedom, [Sending Afghan citizens to Syria by the IRGC \(first part\)](#)

⁹¹ People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, [Exposing the training centers of the Quds terrorist force for the export of terrorism](#)

⁹² Alef News, [Sardar Chaharbaghi: Haj Qasim was surrounded by ISIS for 15 days](#)

⁹³ BBC News, [Afghanistan investigates the sending of Afghans to Syria by Iran](#)

⁹⁴ DEFA Press [The dream that made the shepherd, the defender of the shrine/ the secret of Karbala that ended in Syria](#)

Commanders of Pazuki barracks (2013-2015)

- Mohsen Kazemeini, Commander of Mohammad Rasulollah Corps of Tehran
- Mohammad-Ali Allah-Dadi, Commander of the 27th division of Mohammad Rasulollah Ground Forces of Tehran
- Hossein Asadollahi (deceased), Commander of the 27th Division of Mohammad Rasulollah Ground Forces of Tehran

2. Sadoughi barracks, Yazd between 2014 and the end of 2018

Sadoughi barracks are in Jafarzadeh Blvd. in Yazd and are under the command of Al-Ghadir Corps of Yazd province.⁹⁵

According to the testimony of a former member of the Fatemiyoun, “we were trained along with



Location of Sadoughi Training Barracks in Yazd

another group of Afghan citizens in a military barracks in Yazd and then sent to Syria.” He continued, “In Yazd, we received military training for a month, once you entered, you could not leave, it did not matter if you were young or old, unless, according to the rules there, you paid to get out.”⁹⁶ According to another former member, he along with 1,600

people were trained in the military barracks in Yazd and then sent to Damascus.⁹⁷

Commanders in the Sadoughi barracks in Yazd (2013-2015)

- Akbar Fatuhi, Commander of Al-Ghadir Corps, Yazd Province
- Fathollah Jamiri, Commander of Al-Ghadir Corps, Yazd
- Mohammad Hossein Fayaz, Commander of the 18th Al-Ghadir Corps of the Yazd Province Ground Force

⁹⁵ Seerat Shayagan, [The Secret Training Camp for Iran’s Afghan Soldiers](#)

⁹⁶ Farhad Haqiar, [the story of an 90 days in Syria: Afghan immigrant who went to war in Syria](#)

⁹⁷ Radio Farda, [Associated Press: The return of "10,000" trained IRGC to Afghanistan](#)

- Reza Hedayati, Commander of the Sadoughi barracks in Yazd.⁹⁸

3. Basij Imam Reza Specialized Training Center, Mashhad



Location of Imam Reza Basij Specialized Training Center

This center is under the command of the Ansar base of Quds Force in Mashhad. Ansar base in Mashhad is the command base and main headquarters of the Quds Force branch that focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Basij Imam Reza Specialized Training Center in Mashhad is also used by the provincial IRGC base in Khorasan Razavi province, Imam Reza Guard, the

commanders of this provincial guard and the ground forces for both are responsible.^{99 100 101 102}

Commanders of Basij Imam Reza Specialized Training Center (2015-2019)

- Esmail Qaani, the former commander of the Quds Force's Ansar base in Mashhad
- Seyed Hasan Mousavi, the commander of the Quds Force's Ansar base in Mashhad
- Gholamreza Ahmadi, Commander of the Imam Reza Corps of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Yaghub-Ali Nazari, Commander of Imam Reza Corps of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Mojtaba Ghafurpour, Commander of the 5th Nasr Division of the Ground Forces of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Ahmad Shafahi, Commander of the 5th Nasr Division of the Ground Forces of Khorasan Razavi Province

⁹⁸ Tabnak Mazandaran, [The commander of the training barracks of Shahid Sadoghi Yazd has changed + photo](#)

⁹⁹ Kaneshka, Nawabi, ['Fatemiyoun Briqade; "Good Taliban" for Iran'](#)

¹⁰⁰ Bill Gertz, [U.S. Identifies Nine Training Camps in Iran for Afghans](#)

¹⁰¹ DEFA Press [The dream that made the shepherd, the defender of the shrine/ the secret of Karbala that ended in Syria](#)

¹⁰² Iran Azadi, [Sending Afghan citizens to Syria by the IRGC \(first part\)](#)

4. Ahmad Ibn Musa Barracks in Fars Province



Location of Ahmad ibn Musa Barracks in Fars Province

Ahmad Ibn Musa barracks in Fars province is located 17km from the Shiraz-Isfahan highway.^{103 104 105} Although this barracks currently belongs to the IRGC navy, it is the only IRGC military training center in Fars province, and as such Fatemiyoun training took place there.⁴⁶ A 2016 report published by Human Rights Watch confirms the use of the Ahmad Ibn Musa Barracks for

Fatemiyoun training.¹⁰⁶

Commanders in Ahmad Ibn Musa barracks in Fars province (2013-2017)

- Gholamhossein Gheibparvar, Commander of Fajr Corps, Fars Province
- Seyed Hashem Ghiasi, Commander of Fajr Corps of Fars province
- Eskander Daneshmandi, Commander of the 19th Division of Fajr Ground Forces of Fars Province

Other Training Centres¹⁰⁷

Reports suggest the existence of two additional training sites in addition to the aforementioned training centers. One is Chamran, located near Pazuki, and the other is the "Khair al-Hafezin" camp near Shahryar city. It has been reported that approximately one hundred Fatemiyoun soldiers

¹⁰³ Iran Azadi, [Sending Afghan citizens to Syria by the IRGC \(first part\)](#)

¹⁰⁴ DEFA Press [The dream that made the shepherd, the defender of the shrine/ the secret of Karbala that ended in Syria](#)

¹⁰⁵ People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, [Exposing the training centers of the Quds terrorist force for the export of terrorism](#)

¹⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

¹⁰⁷ Commanders in the Annex

participated in each training course at Chamran, under the command of Colonel Hosseini Moghadam.¹⁰⁸

It has been reported that, "Khair al-Hafezin" was a place of holding prior to departure to Syria. The Khair al-Hafezin camp is also the place of recovery for the wounded Fatemiyoun who returned from Syria.¹⁰⁹

Former Fatemiyoun soldiers' testimonies and various sources indicate that the duration of training for Fatemiyoun members varied between three to four weeks. The training period typically lasted a minimum of three weeks and a maximum of four weeks.^{24 42 46 47 48}

Training activities included trench construction techniques, radio communication training (including wireless usage), instruction in handling light and heavy weapons such as the AK-47, sniper rifles, RPG-7s, DShKs, howitzers, as well as basic infantry tactical training for the Fatemiyoun Brigade.^{110 111 112}

TESTIMONY

As per international standards, States and military leaders¹¹³ have the responsibility to provide extensive training to military personnel, ensuring their compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which encompasses both legal rules and customary practices.

Consistent and repetitive training is an integral component of military instruction. However, considering that most Fatemiyoun members received only three to four weeks of training, primarily focused on operational military tactics, it can be inferred that the crucial elements of IHL

¹⁰⁸ Mehdi Hasan Begi, [Sending Afghan citizens to Syria by the IRGC](#)

¹⁰⁹ Iran Azadi [Fatemiyoun Division in Syria and their losses during the war in this country \(Part II\)](#)

¹¹⁰ Iran Azadi, [Sending Afghan citizens to Syria by the IRGC \(first part\)](#)

¹¹¹ People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, [Exposing the training centers of the Quds terrorist force for the export of terrorism](#)

¹¹² Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

¹¹³ The list of commanders in the annex provides an overview of who was in charge, even though all the human rights and humanitarian law violations can not be linked to every individual listed, they are obligated to do their due diligence, and as commanders of the barracks they are required to follow IHL and also ensure that no child soldiers are being recruited.

were not adequately addressed. The training of combatants in the laws and customs outlined by IHL is crucial for conducting warfare in a just manner.

Moreover, such training ensures that armed combatants demonstrate respect towards individuals who are not directly involved in the armed conflict (DPH vs non DPH). It covers topics such as the treatment of prisoners of war, medical personnel, and other individuals and objects impacted by conflict. By imparting this knowledge, military personnel gain a comprehensive understanding of their obligations and responsibilities, fostering a culture of adherence to IHL principles.

A former member of Fatemiyoun has testified in this context: "Once we were under severe siege and called the Iranian commander, and asked for help and withdrawal, the commander said that you are Afghan, war is in your blood, fight to survive and win." According to this former member of Fatemiyoun, many of his companions in Fatemiyoun were killed in this war and many were seriously injured. Also, according to the testimony of a former Fatemiyoun member, in some cases Iranian commanders (members of the Quds Force and the IRGC) have threatened the Fatemiyoun Brigade that if they do not follow their orders, or stop fighting and retreat, they would shoot at them.^{42 46}

Several former Fatemiyoun members have cited various reasons that led to very high casualties among these forces in Syria. Inadequate military training, unpreparedness of the forces, as well as the lack of sufficient military equipment and weapons are among the key factors responsible for their losses. For instance, in one case, a group of Fatemiyoun members was sent to the frontline of the war against Al-Nusra Front in the Khan Tuman region of Aleppo immediately after arriving in Syria.¹¹⁴ According to the testimony of a former Fatemiyoun member, during one of the battles in Khan Tuman, "800 Afghans were sent to the frontline, and only 200 of them returned alive or injured."¹¹⁵

In another testimony, a former member of Fatemiyoun stated that during a battle in the suburbs of Damascus against ISIS, only 300 out of 1700 members survived after 10 hours of intense fighting.

¹¹⁴ Radio Zamaneh, [The return of Fatemiyoun to Afghanistan: the nightmare of war and poverty has no end](#)

¹¹⁵ Radio Zamaneh, [The return of Fatemiyoun to Afghanistan: the nightmare of war and poverty has no end](#)

Fatemiyoun members typically stay in Syria for up to three months if they are not injured. After three months, they are returned to Iran for a 15-day rest period, and then they may be sent back to Syria for a second deployment.¹¹⁶ However, some narratives suggest that some members of Fatemiyoun have been present in the Syrian war for much longer periods, ranging from 1 to 4 years.¹¹⁷

The exact number of casualties suffered by the Fatemiyoun Brigade is not known precisely. In January 2018, Zuhair Mojahed, the cultural officer of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, announced that at least two thousand members of the force were killed in Syria. However, there are conflicting reports about the treatment and support received by the Fatemiyoun members during and after their deployments.

Some accounts vindicate that the wages of Fatemiyoun members were paid by the Revolutionary Guards, and there was a hotline established in Mashhad, managed by the "Fatemi Pilgrimage Company" to address the problems faced by Fatemiyoun members and their families.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, there are other narratives that speak of the failure of the IRGC to fulfill its promises upon the troops' return from Syria.

According to some former members of Fatemiyoun, the salary they received was not as promised. For instance, one member reported that while his monthly salary was announced to be 3 million tomans, he received only 5 million tomans after three months of service in the war.¹¹⁹ Additionally, there were issues with the citizenship card promised to the members, which did not grant them the expected privileges. A former member stated they didn't pay our money in full. They said that we would give you a citizenship card so that you would be able to work freely or ask for your family, which was all a lie. Even with the card they gave me, I could not buy a SIM card for myself.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, [The Fatemiyoun Division Afghan Fighters in the Syrian Civil War](#)

¹¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

¹¹⁸ Tasnim News, [Fatemi talk phone to solve the problems of Fatemiyoun martyrs family](#)

¹¹⁹ Salaam Times, [Iran deports the members of Fatemiyoun Brigade despite the promises of residence documents](#)

¹²⁰ Salaam Times, [The publication of videos of Iranians beating Afghan immigrants provoked violent protests](#)

Another concerning aspect highlighted by a former Fatemiyoun member is that after being wounded three times in Syria and returning to Iran, he was neglected by the IRGC and denied treatment. This member asserted that despite seeking treatment at relevant IRGC hospitals, he was not provided with the necessary medical care.¹²¹

According to this former member, the neglect of wounded individuals and the families of deceased Fatemiyoun members became more apparent after Qasem Soleimani's announcement of the end of ISIS control in Syria in a letter to Khamenei.

It is important to note that the experiences and testimonies of Fatemiyoun members may vary, and the overall situation is complex, with differing accounts of the support and treatment provided to the brigade members during and after their deployment. The consistent theme in various narrations and testimonies is that the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a militia group supported by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force and comprising Afghan fighters, has consistently been assigned to the frontline during the war in Syria. Consequently, they have suffered a disproportionately high number of casualties compared to Iranian and Syrian forces. Former members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade have come forward in discussions with the media and human rights organizations, revealing that they experienced pressure from Iranian commanders of the Quds Force to remain on the frontline and engage in combat, even when they lacked adequate military equipment and reinforcements. This suggests that they were subjected to a demanding and perilous operational environment, resulting in significant losses among their ranks.^{122 123}

These accounts highlight the serious challenges faced by the Fatemiyoun forces in Syria, which include insufficient training, lack of preparedness, and a shortage of essential military resources. Such factors have had a significant impact on their ability to effectively engage in combat and have resulted in devastating losses on multiple occasions. Further, it also shows a clear violation of IHL. Article 12, of Geneva Convention (I) obliges the protection and care of the wounded and

¹²¹ Mukhtar Wafai, "[Lashgar Fatemiyoun: The Iranian government's abuse of the poverty of Afghan immigrants](#)"

¹²² BBC, [Afghanistan investigates the sending of Afghans to Syria by Iran](#)

¹²³ Human Rights Watch, [Iran sends thousands of Afghans to fight in Syria](#)

sick and gives them adequate medical treatment based on their injuries.¹²⁴ Respecting IHL is necessary to limit the effect of an armed conflict and to lessen the chance of committing grave breaches of IHL.

CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: IRAN'S OBLIGATION

While Iran has not signed Addition Protocol I and II of the Geneva Convention, it has agreed to abide by other international accords that prohibit the use of child soldiers. Moreover, the use of child soldiers is strongly prohibited under customary international law.¹²⁵

Firstly, Iran has signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Article 38(2) of the CRC states that States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons under the age of fifteen do not take a direct part in hostilities.¹²⁶ Additionally, those between the ages of 15 and 18 should not be given priority in participating in hostilities when older individuals are present. While Iran has signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, it has not been ratified.

Furthermore, according to Article 50(2) of the Geneva Convention IV, an occupying power may not enlist children "in formations or organizations subordinate to it".¹²⁷ This provision also applies to those under the age of 15 and requires that those enlisted do not participate in direct hostilities. Iran has also ratified the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, which defines anyone under the age of 18 as a child.¹²⁸ Under Article 3(a) of this convention, the compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict is prohibited.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention)*, 12 August 1949,

¹²⁵ Given the intricate composition of the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the enlistment of Afghan migrants, trained in Iran, for combat in Syria, numerous intersectional jurisdictional questions arise regarding accountability. While these questions are beyond the scope of this report, they deserve further analysis.

¹²⁶ UN General Assembly, *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577,

¹²⁷ *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)*, 12 August 1949

¹²⁸ Inter-Parliamentary Union, [Eliminating the Worst forms of Child Labour](#), 2002,

¹²⁹ Inter-Parliamentary Union, [Eliminating the Worst forms of Child Labour](#), 2002,

During the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General stated that Article 4 of Additional Protocol II is customary international law.¹³⁰ It is fair to say that most states condemn the use of children participating in hostilities, and many military manuals explicitly prohibit it. Further, Iran has made various binding and non-binding commitments to refrain from using child soldiers, therefore committing themselves to the prohibition of using child soldiers.

CONCLUSION

Iran's pattern of exploiting vulnerable individuals, including Afghan immigrants and children, in their military and paramilitary activities is deeply concerning. Despite international commitments to uphold humanitarian law, evidence suggests a disregard for basic human rights principles. The recruitment of children into armed conflicts, deceptive tactics used to lure them into combat, and their exploitation for propaganda purposes reflect a blatant violation of international norms.¹³¹

Iran's history of employing child soldiers, dating back to the Iran-Iraq War, underscores a troubling pattern of disregard for the welfare of its youngest citizens and a blatant disregard for international legal standards.¹³² Such actions demand scrutiny and accountability from the international community to ensure the protection of children from exploitation and abuse in conflict zones. Iran should immediately sign and ratify the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, to promote and ensure the protection of children's rights.

¹³⁰ Rule 137. Participation of Child Soldiers in Hostilities

¹³¹ Iran Still Uses Child Soldiers — And There's No Way to Stop It, Niloufar Rostami, April, 30,2019, <https://iranwire.com/en/features/65997/>

¹³² Iran Still Uses Child Soldiers — And There's No Way to Stop It, Niloufar Rostami, April, 30,2019, <https://iranwire.com/en/features/65997/>

MAP OF THE CEMETERIES INSPECTED IN THIS REPORT



رسم توضیحی 1 لوکیشن قبرستانهای بازرسی شده توسط دادگستر

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ANNEX:

GRAVES AND NAMES OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Through field investigations, Spreading Justice has been able to verify the identities of 16 individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of their death in the Syrian war. These individuals were members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade. In addition to these 16 cases, three other cases documented by Human Rights Watch have also been included in this report.¹³³ The following are the names of those who were confirmed to be under 18 years old at the time of their death.

Please refer to the appendix of this report for a more comprehensive list of names, including individuals whose age at the time of hostilities is uncertain.

1



Amin Hosseini - age at the time of death: 14 years - buried in Golestan Shahada Cemetery, Isfahan (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

2



Mohammad Bakshi - age at the time of death: 15 years and 4 months - buried in Behesht Masoumeh Qom Cemetery (documented by the field investigation by the SJ)

¹³³ Human Rights Watch, [Iran: Afghan Children Recruited to Fight in Syria](#)

3



Mehdi Ahmadi - age at the time of death: 16 years and 10 months - buried in Behesht Zahra Cemetery, Tehran (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

4



Seyed Mustafa Hosseini - age at the time of death: 16 years and 6 months - buried in Golestan Shahada Cemetery, Isfahan (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

5



Morteza Rajabi - age at the time of death: 17 years - buried in Behesht Reza Cemetery, Mashhad (documented by the field investigation by the SJ)

6



Mohammad Hossein Akbari - age at the time of death: 17 years and 1 month - buried in Behesht Zahra Cemetery, Tehran (documented by the field investigation by the SJ)

7




Wajahat Ali - Age at the time of death: 17 years and 1 month - Buried in Behesht Masooma Cemetery, Qom, probably a member of the Zainbayun group (Pakistani militias) (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

8



Javid Hussain - age at the time of death: 17 years and 10 months - buried in Behesht Masoumeh Cemetery, Qom - probably a member of the Zainbion group (Pakistani militias) (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

9



Yar Mohammad Amiri - age at the time of death: 17 years and 2 months - buried in Behesht Zahra Cemetery, Tehran (documented by a field investigation by the SJ)

10



Mohammad Asef Yousefi - age at the time of death: 17 years and 2 months - buried in Imamzadeh Reza Hossein Cemetery, Varamin (documented by the field investigation by the SJ)

11



Alireza Rahimi - age at the time of death: 17 years and 4 months - buried in Behesht Zahra Cemetery, Tehran (documented by a field investigation by the SJ)

12



Javad Gholami - age at the time of death: 17 years and 5 months - buried in Behesht Reza Cemetery, Mashhad (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

13



Navid Hussain - age at the time of death: 17 years and 5 months - buried in Behesht Masoumeh Cemetery, Qom - probably a member of the Zainbion group (Pakistani militias) (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

14



Seyed Ahmad Torabi - age at the time of death: 17 years and 7 months - buried in Golestan Shahada Cemetery, Isfahan (documented by the field investigation by the SJ)

15



Ramzan Mirzaei - age at the time of death: 17 years and 7 months - buried in Behesht Zahra Cemetery, Tehran (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

16



Seyed Ali Asghar Hosseini - age at the time of death: 17 years and 9 months - buried in Behesht Zahra Cemetery, Tehran (documented by field investigation by the SJ)

17



Noor Mohammad Davoodi - age at the time of death: 15 years - buried in Pakdasht cemetery, Tehran province (documented by HRW)

18



Khodadad Najafi - Age at the time of death: 16 years old -
Buried in Savjbalag in Alborz province (documented by
HRW)

19



Idris Bayati - age at death: 17 years - buried in Najaf Abad
Cemetery in Isfahan province (documented by HRW)

Responsible commanders in Isfahan province between 2014 and 2018

- Asghar Arabpour, commander of the 14th Division of Imam Hossein Ground Force of Isfahan province
- Gholamreza Soleimani Farsani, Commander of Saheb Al-Zaman Corps, Isfahan Province

Imam Hossein Basij battalions of Isfahan from the 14th division of Imam Hossein Isfahan

- Ruhollah Ashuri, Commander of the 101st Battalion of Imam Hossein (since February 2019)
- Ahmad Tovasli, Deputy Commander of the 102nd Imam Hossein Battalion (until December 2018)
- Rahim Akbari, Commander of the 123rd Imam Hossein Battalion - Tiran, Isfahan (August 2019)
- Mostafa Rouhani, Commander of the 103rd Imam Hossein Battalion (September 2019)
- Colonel Khosravi, Commander of the 106th Battalion of Imam Hossein (March 2019)
- Mohammad Jokar, Commander of the 105th Imam Hossein Battalion (October 2018)
- 109th Battalion of Imam Hossein, Mobarakeh city (2018)

Responsible commanders in Razavi Khorasan province between 2014 and autumn 2018

- Mojtaba Ghafurpour, Commander of the 5th Nasr Division of the Ground Forces of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Ahmad Shafahi, Commander of the 5th Nasr Division of the Ground Forces of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Gholamreza Ahmadi, Commander of the Imam Reza Corps of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Yaghub-Ali Nazari, Commander of Imam Reza Corps of Khorasan Razavi Province
- Ali-Akbar Tehrani, Commander of the Imam Hossein Battalion of the IRGC in Taibad (November 2020)
- Kazem Nejati, Commander of the Imam Hossein Battalion of Kashmar (October 2017)
- 2nd Imam Hossein Battalion Combat Field - Mashhad, Bahman, 22 Bahman Blvd., 22 Bahman 4th St

Responsible commanders in Qom province between 2014 and the end of 2018

- Seyed Ali Seyedi, Commander of the 17th division of Ali Ibn Abitaleb, Ground Force of Qom province
- Asadollah Ganjali, Commander of the 17th division of Ali Ibn Abitaleb, Ground Force of Qom province
- Mehdi Mahdavejad, Commander of the Ali Ibn Abitaleb Force of Qom province
- Gholamreza Ahmadi, Commander of the Ali Ibn Abitalib Force of Qom province

Responsible commanders in Alborz province between 2014 and March 2017

- Hossein Almasi, Commander of the 23rd Khatam al-Anbia division of the IRGC ground force
- Ali Ostad Hosseini, Commander of Imam Hassan Mojtaba's Force in Alborz province
- Seyed Mojtaba Zamani, Commander of Imam Hossein Battalion, Qarchak City (since August 2015)
- Mehdi Moradi, Commander of the Imam Hossein battalion of Ruhollah district of Shahr-e-Rey (since June 2016)
- Imam Hossain Battalion, Mohammadshahr - Mohammadshahr, Mahdasht Road, Ibn Sina St., Banafsheh St
- Mehdi Rasouli (before Abdollah Daneshmand), Commander of Imam Hossein Battalion in Mehrshahr

Responsible commanders in Tehran province between 2013 and 2018


- Mohammad-Ali Allah-Dadi, Commander of the 27th division of Mohammad Rasulollah Ground Forces of Tehran
- Hossein Asadollahi (died), Commander of the 27th Division of Mohammad Rasulollah Ground Forces of Tehran
- Ali Nasiri, Commander of Seyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran province
- Mohsen Kazemeini, Commander of Mohammad Rasulollah Forces, Tehran

Tehran's Imam Hossein battalions with details

- Javad Zolfaghari, Commander of Imam Hossein Battalion, Varamin City (until August 1, 2020)
- Imam Hossein Battalion in Phase 5 of Mehr Pardis housing complex known as Martyr Morteza Ebrahimi Battalion
- 116th Battalion of Imam Hossein - Shahid Rajae St., Naziabad, Tehran
- 116th Kheibar Imam Hossein Battalion - Tehran, Khazaneh, Bahar St., Laleh St, No. 6
- 117th Imam Hossein-Habib Ibn Mazaher Battalion, Tehran, Shandiz, South Sajjad St., Islami St.
- 114th Imam Hossein Battalion - Tehran, Shokoofeh, Shokoofeh St. between Nursalehi and Monazah, Shokoofeh garden
- Imam Hossein Brigade - Tehran, Nejatollahi, Taleghani Street, Safshekan Street, Bimeh Street, No. 4
- Headquarters of 115th Imam Hossein Battalion-Malek Ashtar - Masoudiyeh, Tehran, Imam Reza highway, 1st building, No. 197,188
- 107th Imam Hossein Battalion-Khandagh, Tehran, Khajeh Nezam-ol-Molk, Ejarehdar St., Teimoori St., No. 69
- Special Base of Imam Hossein Battalion - Tehran, Vahidieh St., Qavami St., Armaghani St., No. 59
- 118th Imam Hossein Battalion- Tehran, Shadabad neighborhood, Mohtadi Blvd., Al-Zahra Street

Responsible commanders in Fars province

- Eskander Daneshmandi, Commander of the 19th Division of Fajr Ground Forces of Fars Province
- Gholamhossein Gheibparvar, Commander of Fajr Corps, Fars Province
- Seyed Hashem Ghiasi, Commander of Fajr Corps of Fars province[A19]



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Command chain with an emphasis on the position of Imam Hussein's battalions

**COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF NAMES, INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS WHOSE AGE
AT THE TIME OF HOSTILITIES IS UNCERTAIN.**

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
1	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (7)		Amin	Hosseini	3/20/2000	3/21/2014	14 Years 0 Months	Syria
2	Behesh Masoume Qom (29)		Mohammad	Bakhshi	4/25/2001	8/30/2016	15 Years 4 Months	Syria (Aleppo)
3	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (11)		Mehdi	Ahmadi	10/5/1998	8/12/2015	16 Years 10 Months	Syria
4	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (5)	Seyed	Mostafa	Hosseini	3/20/2000	10/12/2016	16 Years 6 Months	Syria
5	Behesh Reza Mashhad (24)		Morteza	Rajabi	3/21/1999	4/9/2016	17 Years 0 Months	Syria
6	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (53)		Mohammad Hossein	Akbari	8/1/1997	9/12/2014	17 Years 1 Months	Syria
7	Behesh Masoume Qom (54)		Vejahat	Ali	9/5/1997	10/12/2014	17 Years 1 Months	Syria
8	Behesh Masoume Qom (61)		Javid	Hosseini	3/15/1998	2/4/2016	17 Years 10 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
9	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (37)		Yar Mohammad	Amiri	3/20/2000	6/18/2017	17 Years 2 Months	Syria
10	Imamzadeh Reza Hossein Varamin (1)		Mohammad Asef	Yousefi	7/22/2000	10/17/2017	17 Years 2 Months	Syria
11	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (19)		AliReza	Rahimi	7/17/1998	11/23/2015	17 Years 4 Months	Aleppo - Syria
12	Behesh Reza Mashhad (12)		Javad	Gholami	3/21/1997	9/15/2014	17 Years 5 Months	Syria
13	Behesh Masoume Qom (65)		Navid	Hosseini	1/1/1999	6/6/2016	17 Years 5 Months	Syria
14	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (10)	Seyed	Ahmad	Torabi	3/20/1996	11/11/2013	17 Years 7 Months	Syria
15	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (7)		Ramezan	Mirzaie	3/30/1997	11/13/2014	17 Years 7 Months	Aleppo - Syria
16	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (23)	Seyed	Ali Akbar	Hosseini	1/2/1998	11/1/2015	17 Years 9 Months	Syria
17	Behesht Masoume Qom (26)		Salim	Eghbali	3/21/1997	4/20/2015	18 Years 0 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
18	Behesh Masoume Qom (62)		Eftekhar Hossein		3/1/1997	1/11/2016	18 Years 10 Months	Syria
19	Behesh Masoume Qom (16)		Aziz	Ahmadi	9/24/1998	rez8/8/2017	18 Years 10 Months	Syria
20	Behesh Masoume Qom (36)	Seyed	Mohammad Hossein	Razavi	1/1/1999	11/21/2017	18 Years 10 Months	Syria
21	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (40)		Mohammad	Ahmadi	2/22/1998	5/15/2016	18 Years 2 Months	
22	Behesh Masoume Qom (72)		Firouz Ali		6/8/1998	8/10/2016	18 Years 2 Months	Syria
23	Behesh Reza Mashhad (33)	Seyed	Ali	Hosseini	3/21/1998	8/1/2016	18 Years 4 Months	Syria
24	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (57)		Mohammad Taghi	Rezaie	3/20/1996	10/3/2014	18 Years 6 Months	Syria
25	Behesh Masoume Qom (73)	Seyed	Entezar Hossein		4/10/1998	10/17/2016	18 Years 6 Months	Syria
26	Behesh Masoume Qom (57)		Etezaz Hassan		3/31/1997	11/3/2015	18 Years 7 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
27	Behesh Masoume Qom (22)		Vajed	Ali	3/3/1999	10/19/2017	18 Years 7 Months	Syria
28	Behesh Masoume Qom (28)		Ziya	Sharifi	3/20/1996	12/6/2014	18 Years 8 Months	Syria
29	Behesh Masoume Qom (30)		Zaher	Hosseini	3/20/1996	12/6/2014	18 Years 8 Months	Syria
30	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (4)		Mehdi	Jafari	11/22/1998	8/23/2017	18 Years 9 Months	Syria
31	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (3)	Seyed	Aman	Sadat	12/2/1998	9/8/2017	18 Years 9 Months	
32	Behesh Masoume Qom (43)		Ziya	Hosseini	3/20/1996	4/20/2015	19 Years 1 Months	Syria
33	Behesh Masoume Qom (50)		Gholam Mohamma d	Ahmadi	8/29/1995	10/4/2014	19 Years 1 Months	Syria
34	Behesh Masoume Qom (68)		Abdol Ali	Saie	3/21/1997	5/5/2016	19 Years 1 Months	Syria
35	Behesh Reza Mashhad (9)		Reza	Sarvari	3/20/1996	4/20/2015	19 Years 1 Months	Syria
36	Behesh Reza Mashhad (42)		Khodadad	Hosseini	3/21/1997	5/5/2016	19 Years 1 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
37	Behesh Masoume Qom (12)		Alireza	Rezaie	6/22/1997	5/6/2017	19 Years 10 Months	Syria
38	Behesh Masoume Qom (59)	Seyed	Asadollah		12/31/1995	11/24/2015	19 Years 10 Months	Syria
39	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (8)		Mohammad	Hosseini	3/16/1995	2/5/2015	19 Years 10 Months	Syria
40	Behesh Masoume Qom (34)		Ali Ahmad	Hossein Zadeh	3/20/1996	2/27/2016	19 Years 11 Months	Syria
41	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (6)		Masoud	Taheri	3/21/1995	3/2/2015	19 Years 11 Months	Syria
42	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (17)		Hossein	Rezaie	4/21/1994	4/20/2014	19 Years 11 Months	Syria
43	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (21)		Abdollah	Hosseini	2/14/1996	1/28/2016	19 Years 11 Months	Syria
44	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (51)		Masoud	Taheri	3/21/1995	3/2/2015	19 Years 11 Months	Syria
45	Behesh Masoume Qom (63)	Seyed	Sartaj Hossein		12/3/1996	2/25/2016	19 Years 2 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
46	Behesh Masoume Qom (66)	Seyed	Mehdi	Sharifi	3/21/1997	6/5/2016	19 Years 2 Months	Syria
47	Behesh Masoume Qom (41)	Seyed	Mostafa	Musavi	12/23/1995	4/20/2015	19 Years 3 Months	Syria
48	Behesh Reza Mashhad (23)		Reza	Rahimi	4/22/1997	8/11/2016	19 Years 3 Months	Syria
49	Behesh Masoume Qom (56)		Javid Hossein		6/3/1996	10/18/2015	19 Years 4 Months	Syria
50	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (36)	Seyed	Ismail	Hosseini	3/21/1997	8/11/2016	19 Years 4 Months	Aleppo - Syria
51	Behesh Masoume Qom (8)		Abdollah	Shojaie	11/4/1997	4/5/2017	19 Years 5 Months	Syria
52	Behesh Masoume Qom (53)	Seyed	Amin	Hosseini	3/21/1995	9/1/2014	19 Years 5 Months	Syria
53	Behesh Masoume Qom (58)		Madsar Khan		5/20/1996	11/11/2015	19 Years 5 Months	Syria
54	Behesh Reza Mashhad (8)	Seyed	Hossein	Hosseini	7/5/1996	12/13/2015	19 Years 5 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
55	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (35)		Abdol Hamid	Ibrahimi	3/21/1997	9/11/2016	19 Years 5 Months	Latakia - Syria
56	Behesh Masoume Qom (74)		Liyaghat Hossein		3/21/1997	10/16/2016	19 Years 6 Months	Syria
57	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (6)		Mohammad Hossein	Mohseni	9/16/1996	3/20/2016	19 Years 6 Months	Syria
58	Behesh Reza Mashhad (4)		Morteza	Mohammadi	8/27/1995	4/15/2015	19 Years 7 Months	Syria
59	Behesh Masoume Qom (5)		Taj Mohammad	Karimi	3/21/1997	12/5/2016	19 Years 8 Months	Syria
60	Behesh Masoume Qom (11)	Seyed	Nader	Hosseini	3/21/1997	1/3/2017	19 Years 9 Months	Syria
61	Behesh Masoume Qom (60)		Vasef Ali		3/20/1996	12/31/2015	19 Years 9 Months	Syria
62	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (18)		Sajad	Safdari	7/8/1996	4/13/2016	19 Years 9 Months	Aleppo - Syria
63	Behesh Masoume Qom (25)		Akbar	Amiri	3/21/1995	4/20/2015	20 Years 0 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
64	Behesh Reza Mashhad (38)	Seyed	Hayatollah	Hosseini	3/21/1995	4/20/2015	20 Years 0 Months	Syria
65	Behesh Reza Mashhad (40)	Seyed	Hassan	Hosseini	3/21/1995	4/20/2015	20 Years 0 Months	Syria
66	Shiraz Cemetary (6)		Mohamma d Safar	Nazari	5/4/1996	5/5/2016	20 Years 0 Months	Syria
67	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (11)		Mohamma d Nader	Akhlaghi	12/13/1994	12/13/2014	20 Years 0 Months	Syria
68	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (44)		Mohamma d Bagher	Fasihi	9/2/1996	9/14/2016	20 Years 0 Months	Aleppo - Syria
69	Behesh Masoume Qom (46)		Mojtaba	Amiri	4/3/1995	5/31/2015	20 Years 1 Months	Syria
70	Behesh Reza Mashhad (41)		Mohamma d Arash	Ahmadi	8/24/1996	10/18/2016	20 Years 1 Months	Syria
71	Shiraz Cemetary (1)	Seyed	Zaher	Hosseini	4/20/1996	6/3/2016	20 Years 1 Months	Syria
72	Behesh Masoume Qom (35)	Seyed	Mohamma d		12/31/1996	11/19/2017	20 Years 10 Months	Syria
73	Behesh Masoume Qom (39)	Seyed	Aman	Hosseini	3/21/1995	2/1/2016	20 Years 10 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
74	Behesh Masoume Qom (40)		Mirza Nabi	Heydari Zadeh	3/21/1995	2/2/2016	20 Years 10 Months	Syria (Halab)
75	Behesh Masoume Qom (44)		Ismail	Ahmadi	2/1/1995	12/11/2015	20 Years 10 Months	Syria
76	Behesh Reza Mashhad (28)		Aref	Rezvani	3/21/1995	1/23/2016	20 Years 10 Months	Syria
77	Imamzadeh Baba Taher (5)		Gholam	Hosseini	3/20/1996	2/7/2017	20 Years 10 Months	Syria (Khanaser)
78	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (1)		Mohammad Ali	Soultani	3/21/1997	2/4/2018	20 Years 10 Months	Deir ez-Zur - Almayadin - Syria
79	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (24)		Taghi	Rostami	1/24/1997	11/27/2017	20 Years 10 Months	Syria (Al-Bukamal)
80	Behesh Masoume Qom (17)		Norouz	Emami	7/25/1997	9/30/2017	20 Years 2 Months	Syria
81	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (12)		Mohammad	Etemadi	3/21/1995	6/2/2015	20 Years 2 Months	Syria
82	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (46)		Hamidollah	Soultani	3/20/1996	6/6/2016	20 Years 2 Months	Aleppo - Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
83	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (59)		Azizollah	Rasouli	7/2/1994	9/11/2014	20 Years 2 Months	Syria
84	Behesh Masoume Qom (38)		Bashir	Nateghi	3/21/1997	6/28/2017	20 Years 3 Months	Syria
85	Behesh Reza Mashhad (7)		Hamid	Ehsani	7/15/1993	11/10/2013	20 Years 3 Months	Syria
86	Behesh Reza Mashhad (32)		Ali	Ahmadi	5/22/1996	9/2/2016	20 Years 3 Months	Syria
87	Imamzadeh Reza Hosseini Varamin (4)		Najibollah	Kazemi	7/23/1997	10/24/2017	20 Years 3 Months	Syria
88	Behesh Masoume Qom (3)	Seyed	Mostafa	Hosseini	3/20/1996	7/30/2016	20 Years 4 Months	Syria
89	Behesh Masoume Qom (71)		Navid Ali		1/1/1996	5/6/2016	20 Years 4 Months	Syria
90	Imamzadeh Baba Taher (3)		Najibollah	Nouri	3/21/1997	8/9/2017	20 Years 4 Months	Syria
91	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (13)		Mohamma d	Jafari	3/21/1995	8/1/2015	20 Years 4 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
92	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (33)		Aman	Karimi	3/20/1996	8/12/2016	20 Years 4 Months	Aleppo - Syria
93	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (34)		Morteza	Mousavi	3/20/1996	8/1/2016	20 Years 4 Months	Aleppo - Syria
94	Behesh Masoume Qom (4)		Hossein	Ghamari	3/20/1996	8/31/2016	20 Years 5 Months	Syria
95	Behesh Masoume Qom (47)		Mohammad	Ibrahimi	3/1/1995	8/7/2015	20 Years 5 Months	Syria
96	Behesh Masoume Qom (70)		Vaghar Hosein		1/1/1996	6/6/2016	20 Years 5 Months	Syria
97	Behesh Reza Mashhad (6)		Mehdi	Akhlaghi	3/21/1995	9/10/2015	20 Years 5 Months	Syria
98	Behesh Reza Mashhad (11)	Seyed	Ali	Hosseini	3/21/1994	9/17/2014	20 Years 5 Months	Syria
99	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (39)		Mehdi	Gholami	12/23/1995	6/10/2016	20 Years 5 Months	Aleppo - Syria
100	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (47)		Javad	Mohammadi	3/20/1996	9/2/2016	20 Years 5 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
101	Behesh Masoume Qom (32)		Ishaq	Hosseini	12/3/1995	6/6/2016	20 Years 6 Months	Syria
102	Behesh Masoume Qom (51)		Mohammad Hadi	Salimi	3/25/1994	9/29/2014	20 Years 6 Months	Syria
103	Behesh Reza Mashhad (35)		Mohammad	Amini	3/20/1996	10/11/2016	20 Years 6 Months	Syria
104	Shiraz Cemetery (7)		Mostafa	Hakimi	3/21/1995	10/20/2015	20 Years 6 Months	Syria
105	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (16)		Mohammad Foad	Vahdat	3/21/1994	10/3/2014	20 Years 6 Months	Aleppo - Syria
106	Behesh Masoume Qom (20)		Abdullah	Ebrahimi	3/21/1997	10/30/2017	20 Years 7 Months	Syria
107	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (14)		Zabih	Babaie	3/21/1995	11/6/2015	20 Years 7 Months	Aleppo - Syria
108	Behesh Masoume Qom (24)		Aziz	Nouri	4/20/1996	1/19/2017	20 Years 8 Months	Syria
109	Behesh Masoume Qom (33)		Ghader	Hosseini	3/21/1995	12/8/2015	20 Years 8 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
110	Behesh Reza Mashhad (30)		Hassan	Rahimi	4/4/1995	12/24/2015	20 Years 8 Months	Syria
111	Behesh Reza Mashhad (44)		Mojtaba	Vaezi	5/10/1993	1/19/2014	20 Years 8 Months	Syria
112	Imamzadeh Baba Taher (2)		Ali	Doust Hosseini	3/20/1996	12/5/2016	20 Years 8 Months	Syria
113	Behesh Masoume Qom (13)		Gholam Ali	Ghorbani	3/20/1996	1/9/2017	20 Years 9 Months	Syria
114	Behesh Masoume Qom (21)	Seyed	Ahmad	Hosseini	3/21/1997	1/1/2018	20 Years 9 Months	Syria
115	Behesh Masoume Qom (23)	Seyed	Zahed	Hosseini	4/8/1999	2/4/2020	20 Years 9 Months	Syria
116	Behesh Masoume Qom (64)		Morteza Hosseini	Heydari	5/8/1995	2/25/2016	20 Years 9 Months	Syria
117	Behesh Masoume Qom (75)		Mazmel Hosseini		1/1/1996	10/17/2016	20 Years 9 Months	Syria
118	Shiraz Cemetery (2)		Jamshid	Ahmadi	2/25/1995	12/21/2015	20 Years 9 Months	Syria
119	Behesh Masoume Qom (42)		Reza	Rahimi	3/21/1994	4/20/2015	21 Years 0 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
120	Behesh Masoume Qom (67)		Yadollah	Saie	3/21/1995	4/9/2016	21 Years 0 Months	Syria
121	Behesh Masoume Qom (69)		Reza	Rastegrai	3/21/1995	4/16/2016	21 Years 0 Months	Syria
122	Behesh Reza Mashhad (27)		Morteza	Douran	3/21/1995	4/12/2016	21 Years 0 Months	Syria
123	Shiraz Cemetary (5)		Mohammad	Bagheri	3/21/1994	4/20/2015	21 Years 0 Months	Syria
124	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (9)		Naser	Hosseini	3/21/1994	4/20/2015	21 Years 0 Months	Syria
125	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (30)		Ghafor	Hassani	3/21/1995	4/6/2016	21 Years 0 Months	Aleppo - Syria
126	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (41)		Mohammad Reza	Rezaie	3/20/1996	3/26/2017	21 Years 0 Months	Hama - Syria
127	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (49)		Naser	Hosseini	3/21/1994	4/20/2015	21 Years 0 Months	Syria
128	Behesh Masoume Qom (1)		Abdol Ali	Ghayomi	3/21/1995	5/5/2016	21 Years 1 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
129	Behesh Masoume Qom (27)		Mohammad Amin	Nazari	3/28/1995	5/5/2016	21 Years 1 Months	Syria
130	Behesh Masoume Qom (31)	Seyed	Reza	Hosseini	3/21/1995	5/5/2016	21 Years 1 Months	Syria
131	Behesh Masoume Qom (49)		Alireza	Mohammadi	3/1/1993	4/14/2014	21 Years 1 Months	Syria
132	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (32)	Seyed	Mostafa	Shah Hosseini	4/13/1996	5/22/2017	21 Years 1 Months	Syria
133	Behesh Masoume Qom (7)		Mohammad	Hassani	3/21/1995	2/26/2017	21 Years 11 Months	Syria
134	Behesh Masoume Qom (48)		Habib Allah	Heydari	3/1/1993	2/28/2015	21 Years 11 Months	Syria
135	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (10)		Abdol Samad	Hosseini	3/21/1993	2/28/2015	21 Years 11 Months	Syria
136	Behesh Masoume Qom (2)		Sajad	Hosseini	3/21/1995	6/14/2016	21 Years 2 Months	Syria
137	Behesh Reza Mashhad (26)		Mohammad	Ibrahimi	3/21/1995	6/3/2016	21 Years 2 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
138	Behesht Sakineh Karaj (1)		Zamen	Etemadi	3/21/1995	6/3/2016	21 Years 2 Months	Syria
139	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (31)		Delbar	Ibrahimi	3/21/1995	6/3/2016	21 Years 2 Months	Aleppo - Syria
140	Behesh Masoume Qom (10)		Mohammad Mehdi	Ghorbani	10/10/1995	1/24/2017	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
141	Behesh Masoume Qom (37)		Yousef	Ali	9/24/1995	12/24/2016	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
142	Behesh Masoume Qom (45)		Mohammad Davoud	Rezaie	3/21/1994	7/19/2015	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
143	Behesh Reza Mashhad (2)		Reza	Ismaili	10/18/1992	1/28/2014	21 Years 3 Months	Zamanieh Town, Damascus - Syria
144	Behesh Reza Mashhad (21)		Moustafa	Moradi	3/21/1995	7/19/2016	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
145	Behesh Reza Mashhad (43)		Mostafa	Mohammadi	5/28/1995	8/30/2016	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
146	Imamzadeh Reza Hossein Varamin (3)		Mohammad Akbar	Rezaie	7/25/1996	11/19/2017	21 Years 3 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
147	Shiraz Cemetery (3)		Sang Ali	Heydari	8/24/1995	12/12/2016	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
148	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (9)	Seyed	Mehdi	Salmani	7/19/1992	11/11/2013	21 Years 3 Months	Syria
149	Behesh Masoume Qom (18)		Mohammad	Balkhi	4/20/1996	9/4/2017	21 Years 4 Months	Syria
150	Golestan Shohada Isfahan (2)		Morteza	Karimi	3/21/1994	7/22/2015	21 Years 4 Months	Syria
151	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (2)		Mohammad Hossein	Khoda Panah	5/1/1993	9/11/2014	21 Years 4 Months	Syria
152	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (26)		Najib	Mohammadi	3/20/1996	8/8/2017	21 Years 4 Months	Hamas - Syria
153	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (42)		Eyvaz Ali	Yousefi	3/21/1995	8/18/2016	21 Years 4 Months	Aleppo - Syria
154	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (48)		Mohammad Mehdi	Saberi	11/23/1993	4/20/2015	21 Years 4 Months	Syria
155	Behesh Masoume Qom (55)	Seyed	Mohammad Taghi		5/2/1993	10/22/2014	21 Years 5 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
156	Behesh Reza Mashhad (3)	Seyed	Ghasem	Hosseini	8/14/1992	2/6/2014	21 Years 5 Months	Syria
157	Shiraz Cemetery (4)		Mohammad Heydar	Ahmadi	4/3/1996	9/11/2017	21 Years 5 Months	Syria
158	Behesh Masoume Qom (6)	Seyed	Amin	Hosseini	5/27/1995	12/23/2016	21 Years 6 Months	Syria
159	Behesh Masoume Qom (52)		Mostafa	Khademi	3/21/1993	9/29/2014	21 Years 6 Months	Syria
160	Imamzadeh Reza Hossein Varamin (2)		Yasin	Gholami	3/20/1996	10/16/2017	21 Years 6 Months	Syria
161	Imamzadeh Baba Taher (7)		Asadollah	Ibrahimi	3/20/1996	10/5/2017	21 Years 6 Months	Syria
162	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (4)		Hafizollah	Khodadadi	3/21/1993	10/2/2014	21 Years 6 Months	Syria
163	Behesh Masoume Qom (19)		Aref	Rezaie	3/20/1996	11/14/2017	21 Years 7 Months	Syria
164	Behesh Reza Mashhad (10)	Seyed	Habib	Shojaie	4/14/1993	12/10/2014	21 Years 7 Months	Syria
165	Behesh Reza Mashhad (15)		Rouhollah	Rezaie	5/4/1992	12/19/2013	21 Years 7 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
166	Behesh Reza Mashhad (36)		Gholam Ali	Khavari	5/14/1996	12/19/2017	21 Years 7 Months	Syria
167	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (27)		Reza	Ismaili	3/21/1995	11/17/2016	21 Years 7 Months	Aleppo - Syria
168	Behesh Reza Mashhad (5)		Kazem	Tavasoli	3/21/1994	11/23/2015	21 Years 8 Months	Syria
169	Behesh Reza Mashhad (14)	Seyed	mohamma d Javid	Hosseini	3/21/1994	11/27/2015	21 Years 8 Months	Syria
170	Behesh Reza Mashhad (25)		Naser	Jalili	3/21/1994	11/27/2015	21 Years 8 Months	Syria
171	Behesh Reza Mashhad (29)		Mohamma d	Safari	3/21/1994	11/27/2015	21 Years 8 Months	Syria
172	Imamzadeh Reza Hossein Varamin (5)		Mohamma d Reza	Ahmadi	11/28/1995	8/23/2017	21 Years 8 Months	
173	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (15)		Mehdi	Ahmadi	3/21/1994	12/9/2015	21 Years 8 Months	Syria
174	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (22)		Mohamma d Hassan	Jafari	3/21/1995	11/21/2016	21 Years 8 Months	Aleppo - Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
175	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (43)		Javad	Bakhshi	3/21/1995	12/5/2016	21 Years 8 Months	Syria
176	Behesh Reza Mashhad (39)	Seyed	Nasrollah	Hosseini	3/21/1993	4/20/2015	22 Years 0 Months	Syria
177	Behesh Masoume Qom (14)		Mohammad Allah	Asadi	7/24/1995	8/7/2017	22 Years 0 Months 14 Days	Syria
178	Behesh Masoume Qom (15)		Nematollah	Mohammadi	7/25/1995	8/2/2017	22 Years 0 Months 8 Days	Syria
179	Behesh Reza Mashhad (31)		Mohammad	Rahmani	3/21/1993	2/3/2016	22 Years 10 Months	Syria
180	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (5)	Seyed	Hamid	Yazdani	3/21/1992	1/26/2015	22 Years 10 Months	Syria
181	Behesh Reza Mashhad (13)	Seyed	Hossein	Hosseini	3/21/1992	2/27/2015	22 Years 11 Months	Syria
182	Behesh Reza Mashhad (22)		Morteza	AkbarZadeh	3/21/1994	6/19/2016	22 Years 2 Months	Syria
183	Behesht Zahra Cemetery - Section 50 - 03292022 (25)		Zakariya	Boraghi	3/21/1995	7/6/2017	22 Years 3 Months	Syria

No	Cemetery and Ref No	Prefix	First name	Last name	DOB mmddyyyy	DOD	Age at death	Place of death
184	Behesh Reza Mashhad (34)		Ali Asghar	Ansari	3/21/1993	10/20/2015	22 Years 6 Months	Syria
185	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (3)		Ali Asghar	Yousefi	3/21/1992	10/4/2014	22 Years 6 Months	Syria
186	Behesht Zahra Cemetry - Section 50 - 03292022 (20)		Naim	Akbari	3/21/1995	10/17/2017	22 Years 6 Months	Syria
187	Behesh Reza Mashhad (17)		Hoomayon	Alami	3/28/1995	11/9/2017	22 Years 7 Months	Syria
188	Behesh Reza Mashhad (37)		Salman	Rahimi	3/21/1995	10/24/2017	22 Years 7 Months	Syria

IMAGES OF THE EXAMINED GRAVES

















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